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Abstract 
This research addresses couples’ reports of their (hypothetical) attempts to maintain or change a gendered 
division of labor through conflict interactions. Two experiments in which spouses responded to scenarios 
showed that spouses reported more conflict over the division of housework than conflict over paid work and 
child care, and that wives more often than husbands desired a change in their spouses’ contribution. Spouses 
reported more wife-demand/husband-withdraw than husband-demandlwife-withdraw interaction during 
hypothetical conflict over the division of labor, but only when the wife desired a change in her spouse’s 
contribution. Together, the data imply that wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction is a likely response to 
the asymmetrically structured conflict situation in which the wife is discontent with her husband’s 
contribution to housework, while her husband wants to maintain the status quo. We further showed that 
defenders of the status quo were more likely expected to reach their goal than complainants. In the role of 
complainant, wives were more likely expected to reach their goal than were their husbands, but only when the 
conflict issue concerned their own gender stereotypical domain (i.e., family work). 
The division of labor between husbands 
and wives has interested many social scien- 
tists over the past decades. It is a well- 
known fact that wives still do a much larger 
share of the housework and child care than 
their husbands, regardless of their own or  
their husband’s employment status, both in 
the United States (for reviews, see Ferree, 
1991; Menaghan & Parcel, 1990 Spitze, 
1988) and in Europe (Kalleberg & Rosen- 
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feld, 1990; Kluwer, Heesink, & Van de 
Vliert, 1996, 1997; Mikula, Freudenthaler, 
Brennacher-Kroll, & Schiller-Brandl, 1997). 
In their endeavor to explain this gendered 
role allocation, social scientists have taken 
various theoretical perspectives. One of the 
earliest approaches, the resource approach, 
argued that resources such as income, occu- 
pational status, education, and time are “ex- 
changed” for domestic labor (e.g., Blood & 
Wolfe, 1960; Coverman, 1985). Others have 
studied the effects of structural factors such 
as wives’ working hours and the number 
and age of the children (e.g., Barnett & 
Baruch, 1987; Cowan & Cowan, 1987). The 
gender role ideology model claimed that be- 
liefs and attitudes toward gender roles are 
responsible for the division of domestic 
work (e.g., Greenstein, 1996). Recently, the 
life-course perspective has focused on the 
effects of the timing, sequencing, and dura- 
tion of life events such as marital timing 
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and child bearing upon the task allocation 
(e.g., Pittman & Blanchard, 1996). 
These perspectives generally start from 
the principle that the division of labor is a 
static agreement between spouses. Rela- 
tively little attention has been paid to the 
way couples constitute, maintain, or change 
the gendered division of labor through their 
mutual interactions. (For some exceptions, 
see Deutsch, Lussier, & Servis, 1993; Klu- 
wer et al., 1997; Scanzoni & Fox, 1980). 
Prior research lacks the notion that the di- 
vision of labor is actively negotiated be- 
tween spouses on a continuous basis (cf. 
Greenstein, 1996; Pittman, Solheim, & 
Blanchard, 1996). However, given the social 
changes with regard to women’s partici- 
pation in the labor force and relationships 
becoming more egalitarian, gender roles 
increasingly become subject to explicit 
negotiation (Buunk, Kluwer, Schuurman, & 
Siero, in press; Kluwer et al., 1997). Re- 
cently, we offered an interaction-based ap- 
proach to the division of labor by studying 
how couples negotiate a division of labor in 
their relationship (Kluwer et al., 1996,1997, 
1999). This perspective starts from the no- 
tion that gender roles are produced and 
maintained in everyday life through inter- 
personal interaction and that the enact- 
ment of gender primarily takes place within 
the context of social interaction (e.g., 
Deaux & Major, 1987). 
The first goal of the present research is to 
increase further our knowledge within this 
larger general framework by studying cou- 
ples’ reports of hypothetical conflict over 
the division of labor. We will argue that con- 
flict issues regarding the division of labor 
often involve one spouse (the complainant) 
who desires change while the other spouse 
(the defendant) wants to maintain the 
status quo. Conflict research (for reviews, 
see De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; 
Levine & Thompson, 1996; Lewicki, Weiss, 
& Lewin, 1992; Thomas, 1992) has largely 
ignored the distinction between complain- 
ants and defendants, implicitly assuming 
that both conflict parties have equal com- 
plaints against each other (Pruitt, 1995). Al- 
though Pruitt and his colleagues (Peirce, 
Pruitt, & Czaja, 1993; Pruitt, 1995) brought 
this distinction to the attention of conflict 
researchers, our knowledge of asymmetrical 
conflict is still limited. Hence, our second 
goal is to gain insight into the impact of 
asymmetrical conflict structures on marital 
interaction and outcomes. 
This research first addresses the conflict 
issues: What do spouses fight most often 
about with regard to the division of labor- 
his or her distress, about paid work, house- 
work, or child care? Although the division 
of labor is among the top-five issues that 
cause relationship conflict (Belsky & Kelly, 
1994; Kluwer et al., 1996,1997), research on 
close relationships has paid relatively little 
attention to the ways couples deal with con- 
tentious issues (cf. Fincham & Beach, 1999). 
Contentious issues elicit immediate anger 
and distrust and therefore tend to cause 
normally happy couples to get caught up in 
destructive interaction patterns (Holmes & 
Murray, 1996). In studying how couples 
manage their conflicts over the division of 
labor, we focus on asymmetrical demand/ 
withdraw interactions, a destructive interac- 
tion pattern that has been shown to play a 
significant role in conflict over the division 
of labor (Kluwer et al., 1997). Finally, we 
address the asymmetrical outcomes of con- 
flict over the division of labor-status quo 
maintenance versus change. 
Marital Conflict Over the Division 
of Labor 
We expect the division of housework to be 
a greater source of marital conflict than the 
division of paid work (cf. Kluwer et al., 
1996, 1997). Spouses will perceive their 
working hours to be relatively static be- 
cause they are usually tied to a labor con- 
tract. Also, an unequal division of house- 
work is more likely to cause distress and 
conflict than an unequal division of child 
care. Housework is generally rather dis- 
liked, often regarded as a burden or duty 
(Mikula et al., 1997), and people tend to 
prefer doing less rather than doing more 
(Kluwer et al., 1996). Child-care tasks tend 
to be more pleasant and rewarding than 
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housework. In addition, perceiving the divi- 
sion of child-care tasks as unfair and expe- 
riencing conflict over its allocation is a deli- 
cate issue because it may be interpreted as 
not caring about the child (Mederer, 1993). 
Hence, we predict that conflict over the divi- 
sion of housework occurs more frequently 
than conflict over paid work or child care 
(Hypothesis la). 
We expect wives’ rather than husbands’ 
discontent with the division of labor to cause 
marital conflict. Compared with their hus- 
bands, wives generally have a disadvantaged 
position when it comes to the labor distri- 
bution. Also, wives typically have greater 
knowledge and experience with regard to 
housework and child care, which may cause 
them to be more critical toward their spouse 
than husbands are to their wives (cf. Mar- 
golin, Talovic, & Weinstein, 1983). In addi- 
tion, when spouses fight about paid work, 
the issue often concerns the husband’s over- 
time (Kluwer et al., 1996). In sum, we expect 
that wives more often than husbands desire a 
change in their spouses’ contribution to the 
division of labor (Hypothesis lb). 
DemandiWithdraw Interaction Patterns 
Picture the typical situation in which the 
wife is discontent with her husband’s con- 
tribution to housework and wants him to 
increase his participation. Whereas she 
wants to change the status quo and needs 
his active cooperation to reach her objec- 
tive, his goal is to maintain the status quo, 
and he can reach this goal by doing what he 
normally does. In fact, he is likely to avoid 
a discussion and withdraw from the interac- 
tion because it may force him to do more 
housework. This conflict contains an asym- 
metrical structure: One spouse (the com- 
plainant) desires a change in the other 
spouse’s behavior, while the other spouse 
(the defendant) is satisfied with the status 
quo of the relationship. During conflict with 
this particular structure, complainants are 
likely to pressure the other for change, 
whereas defendants will avoid a discussion 
that may lead to a change in their own be- 
havior (cf. Klinetob & Smith, 1996; Peirce et 
al., 1993; Pruitt, 1995)’ 
In close relationships, this type of inter- 
action has been labeled demandwithdraw 
interaction: One spouse attempts to engage 
in a discussion, resorting to pressures and 
demands, while the other attempts to avoid 
conflict and withdraws from the discussion. 
Research has shown that women tend to 
demand and men tend to withdraw in mari- 
tal conflict (e.g., Christensen & Heavey, 
1990, 1993; Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 
1993). Demanding behavior is used as a 
general term for “pursuing” tactics-pres- 
suring, requesting, or demanding change, 
nagging, blaming, accusing, and criticizing. 
Withdrawal entails “distancing” behaviors, 
such as physical withdrawal, becoming si- 
lent, defending, and avoiding a discussion. 
This finding is a notable exception to re- 
search that shows either small or inconsis- 
tent gender differences in conflict behavior 
(see Kluwer, De Dreu, & Buunk, 1998). 
Why do women demand and why do 
men withdraw in close relationships? De- 
velopmental theories claim that men have 
developed a self differentiated from others, 
whereas women have developed a self in 
relation to others (Chodorow, 1978; Cross & 
Madson, 1997; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1986). 
Subsequent socialization reinforces men’s 
achievement orientation and need for 
autonomy and women’s relationship orien- 
tation and need for connectedness (Eagly, 
1987; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987; Miller, 
1986). This gender difference permeates so- 
cial interactions and it predicts women to 
be pursuing in their search for connected- 
ness, whereas it predicts men to withdraw in 
pursuit of their autonomy (cf. Gray-Little & 
Burks, 1983). Others have claimed gender 
differences in conflict behavior to be evolu- 
tion based (e.g., Buss, 1989), the result of 
gender differences in physiological arousal 
(Gottman & Levenson, 1988), or a function 
1. We emphasize that the terms “complainant” and 
“defendant” refer to the roles of conflict parties 
(i.e., wanting change versus wanting to maintain 
the status quo), not to subsequent conflict be- 
haviors. 
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of gender role orientation (e.g., Markman, 
Silvern, elements, & Kraft-Hanak, 1993). 
Although women show an overall ten- 
dency to be demanding and men to be with- 
drawing in marital conflict, there is evi- 
dence that situational influences moderate 
this gender difference (Christensen & 
Heavey, 1990, 1993; Heavey et al., 1993). 
The structure of the conflict appears to de- 
termine the roles men and women take dur- 
ing the interaction. Adopting a social struc- 
tural view, some investigators argue that 
men are the primary beneficiaries of the 
traditional marriage, are more likely to 
have structured the relationship to their lik- 
ing and subsequently have little or less in- 
terest in changing the status quo (Heavey et 
al., 1993; Jacobson, 1989). Women tend to 
be less satisfied with the status quo of the 
relationship (cf. Buunk & Van Yperen, 
1989); thus, engagement in conflict is their 
means of changing the relationship accord- 
ing to their desires. Indeed, Ross and Van 
Willigen (1996) showed that women had 
higher levels of anger due to inequalities in 
the relationship and were more likely to 
express their anger than were men. 
To summarize, women show an overall 
tendency to be demanding and men to be 
withdrawing in marital conflict, but pri- 
marily when the wife wants to change the 
status quo. We therefore expect wife- 
demandhusband-withdraw interaction to 
occur more frequently than husband- 
demandwife-withdraw interaction during 
conflict over the division of labor, but only 
when the wife desires a change in her 
spouse’s contribution to the division of labor 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Study 1 
As a first test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
conducted a survey in which participants 
read and responded to stimulus informa- 
tion manipulated by means of scenarios. We 
used open-ended questions to elicit partici- 
pants’ representations of the interaction 
patterns without being constrained by an 
existing questionnaire. Although self-re- 
port measures of conflict have limitations, 
they also have several advantages for the 
present study. It encourages participants to 
report on private matters such as perceived 
conflict (see Harvey, Hendrick, & Tucker, 
1988), and it enables participants to report 
on conflict avoidance and withdrawal, 
which is less likely to occur in a laboratory 
setting. In contrast to the common use of 
correlational designs in research on the di- 
vision of labor, the use of scenarios enabled 
us experimentally to vary the roles of com- 
plainant and defendant as well as the con- 
flict issue. In addition, our method allowed 
us to use a large “real-life’’ sample of cou- 
ples as opposed to a student sample. 
Method 
Design and scenario. The scenario de- 
scribed a conflict situation in which one 
spouse (the complainant) was dissatisfied 
with the time the other spouse spent doing 
paid work, housework, or child care, while 
the other spouse (the defendant) was satis- 
fied with the status quo (see Table 1). The 
design was a 2 X 3 factorial, involving Com- 
plainant (husband versus wife) and Conflict 
issue (paid work versus housework versus 
child care), both manipulated between-sub- 
jects. 
The between-subjects factor Complain- 
ant was construed by crossing the gender of 
the participant with the role in the scenario 
(complainant or defendant). In other words, 
the Complainant is husband condition con- 
tained male participants in the role of com- 
plainant (“You are dissatisfied . . . ”) and 
female participants in the role of defendant 
(“Your spouse is dissatisfied . . . ”). The 
Complainant is wife condition contained fe- 
male participants in the role of complainant 
and male participants in the role of defen- 
dant. 
Participants and procedure. A total of 121 
husbands and 141 wives participated in this 
study. (Both spouses of 117 couples partici- 
pated and 28 subjects participated while 
their spouses did not.) Spouses had shared 
their household for 7 years on average. To 
standardize the family situation of the cou- 
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Table 1. Conflict scenarios 
Paid work condition: 
“You are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with the time your spouse (you) spends on paid work. For ex- 
ample, you are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with how much your spouse works, how often your 
spouse (you) works overtime, works at home or during the weekend, how much attention your 
spouse (you) pays to work, or how often your spouse (you) talks or thinks about work. In other 
words, you (your spouse) want a change in the time your spouse (you) spends on paid work. How- 
ever, your spouse is (you are) satisfied with the situation as it is. ’’ 
Housework condition: 
“You are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with the time your spouse (you) spends on household tasks. 
For example, you are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with how much attention your spouse pays 
(you pay) to housework, how often your spouse (you) tidies, cleans, does the dishes, does grocer- 
ies, or the way your spouse (you) carries out chores, etcetera. In other words, you (your spouse) 
want a change in the time your spouse (you) spends on housework. However, your spouse is (you 
are) satisfied with the situation as it is. ” 
Child-care condition: 
“You are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with the time your spouse (you) spends on child care tasks. 
For example, you are (your spouse is) dissatisfied with how much attention your spouse pays 
(you pay) to your child, how often your spouse (you) feeds the child, changes diapers, soothes the 
child, plays with the child, or takes the child back and forth to day care. In other words, you (your 
spouse) want a change in the time your spouse (you) spends on child care. However, your spouse is 
(you are) satisfied with the situation as it is. ” 
Note: The wording for the spouse is in parentheses. 
ples and to control for the effects of the 
number and age of children, the criterion for 
selection was that the first and only child 
was under 18 months old ( M  = 14.5, SD = 
1.4). The mean ages of men and women were 
32.9 and 30.4 years, respectively. Partici- 
pants were in a research program on the di- 
vision of labor across the transition to par- 
enthood. Husbands and wives received their 
questionnaire at home in a separate enve- 
lope that was addressed to them personally. 
They were instructed not to discuss the 
questionnaire with their spouse until they 
had completed it, and they returned their 
questionnaires in separate envelopes. Non- 
respondents were reminded by phone. 
Eventually, 74% of the participants re- 
turned their questionnaire by mail. Partici- 
pants were individually assigned to experi- 
mental conditions on a random basis. 
Because of small variations in the response 
rates between conditions and because of 
missing data, the number of male partici- 
pants in the conditions varied between 17 
and 23 and the number of female partici- 
pants in the conditions varied between 21 
and 26. 
Dependent  variables. Participants read the 
scenario and were instructed to try to imag- 
ine they were in the described situation. 
Employing an open-ended question, we 
asked participants to write down how they 
and their spouse would deal with the de- 
scribed situation. Three female judges 
independently rated all answers to the 
open-ended question. They were unin- 
formed as to the design or hypotheses un- 
der study and the gender of the participant, 
although the latter sometimes became ap- 
parent from the answer when participants 
explicitly mentioned their “husband” or 
“wife,” instead of their “spouse” or “part- 
ner.” Judges completed one day of training 
that consisted of a discussion of detailed 
descriptions of the constructs that were to 
be rated. Judges then practiced rating 10 
answers as a group and 10 answers indi- 
vidually. The interrater agreement was as- 
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sessed for each answer, and disagreements 
were solved through discussion. 
Judges independently rated all answers. 
After reading the entire answer, judges 
rated the degree to which the following 
behaviors were representative for the an- 
swer (1 = not representative to 4 = very 
representative): The participant pressures 
the spouse, blames the spouse, discusses, de- 
fends, withdraws, and avoids (cf. Conflict 
Rating System; Heavey et al., 1993; Chris- 
tensen & Heavey, 1990). The same items 
were used to rate the behavior of the 
spouse. Afterwards, data were recoded as to 
the gender of the participant (i.e., when the 
participant was male, “participant dis- 
cusses” became “husband discusses” and 
when the participant was female, “partici- 
pant discusses” became “wife discusses”). 
As a measure of interrater agreement, 
Cronbach’s alphas were computed between 
judges. Alphas for the behavior items 
ranged from .70 to .89, with a mean of .80. 
As a measure of the consistency of the sub- 
scales, Cronbach’s alphas were computed 
across the individual ratings for the items of 
the subscales. The demand-subscale con- 
sisted of the items “pressuring the spouse” 
and “blaming the spouse” (alpha = .81 for 
husband-demand and .82 for wife-demand). 
Consistent with Gottman and Krokoff 
(1989) and Christensen and Heavey (1990), 
the withdraw-subscale consisted of the 
items “withdrawing” and “avoiding” (alpha 
= .77 for husband-withdraw and .64 for 
wife-withdraw). To create the demand/with- 
draw interaction variables, both wife-de- 
mand and husband-withdraw and husband- 
demand and wife-withdraw were summed 
(cf. Christensen & Heavey, 1990; Klinetob & 
Smith, 1996).2 
Finally, we asked participants how often 
2. Judges also gave an overall rating of wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw and husband-demandwife- 
withdraw interaction (interrater agreement = .81 
for both). The overall rating of wife-demand/hus- 
band-withdraw interaction correlated .72 with the 
composite wife-demandlhusband-withdraw mea- 
sure. The overall rating of husband-demandwife- 
withdraw interaction correlated .69 with the com- 
posite husband-demand/wife-withdraw measure. 
the described situation occurred in their 
daily lives (1 = never to 7 = very often). 
Results 
Because we collected data among couples, 
spouses’ responses are likely to be depend- 
ent. This nonindependence violates the in- 
dependence assumption, and the signifi- 
cance tests may be misleading when using 
the total sample (Kenny, 1995, 1996). Be- 
cause of the individual assignment to the 
experimental conditions, however, most 
couple members reported on different con- 
flict situations. It was therefore not justified 
to analyze the data at the couple level. 
Instead, we conducted the analyses for 
husbands and wives separately so that the 
F-tests would not be biased by nonindepen- 
dence. We checked whether the hypothe- 
sized effects were qualified by interactions 
with Gender of participant (as a between- 
subjects variable) in the total sample. None 
of the hypothesized effects were qualified 
by interactions with Gender of participant, 
Fs < 1,ns. 
Conflict over the division of labor. A 2 X 3 
(Complainant X Conflict issue) between- 
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
with the frequency to which the described 
situation occurred in daily life as the de- 
pendent variable, showed main effects of 
Complainant among husbands, F(l, 115) = 
9.05,~ < .01, and wives, F(1,134) = 10.79, 
p < .001 (see Fig. 1). The situation in which 
the wife desired a change in her husband’s 
contribution was reported to occur more 
frequently than the situation in which the 
husband desired a change in his wife’s con- 
tribution, among both husbands ( M  = 2.98, 
SD = 1.50 versus M = 2.33, SD = 1.04), 
and wives ( M  = 3.06, SD = 1.40 versus M 
= 2.25, SD = 1.21). The main effect of Con- 
flict issue was also significant among hus- 
bands, F(2,115) = 5.14,~ < .01, and wives 
F(2, 134) = 5.67, p < .01. Husbands re- 
ported more conflict over housework ( M  = 
3.10, SD = 1.45) than conflict over paid 
work ( M  = 2.48, SD = 1.34), t(78) = 2.01, 
p < .05, or child care ( M  = 2.32, SD = .99), 
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Figure 1. Reported frequency of conflict situation as a function of complainant and 
conflict issue for husbands (a) and wives (b): Study 1. 
479) = 2 . 8 5 , ~  < .01. The latter two did not 
differ significantly, t(79) = .61, ns. Likewise, 
wives reported more conflict over house- 
work ( M  = 3.16, S D  = 1.24) than conflict 
over paid work ( M  = 2.39, S D  = 1.38), 
t(92) = 2.82, p < .01, or child care ( M  = 
2.41, SD = 1.34), t(89) = 2.74, p < .01. 
Again, the latter two did not differ signifi- 
cantly, t(93) = .09, ns. The interaction ef- 
fects of Complainant by Conflict issue were 
not significant, Fs < 28, ns. Thus, in support 
of Hypotheses l a  and lb, both husbands 
and wives reported that conflict over 
housework occurred more frequently than 
conflict over paid work and child care and 
that wives more often desired a change in 
their spouses’ contribution than did hus- 
bands. 
Demandwithdraw interaction. Hypothe- 
sis 2 was tested with a 2 X 2 (Complainant X 
Demandwithdraw interaction) ANOVA, 
with Demand/withdraw interaction as re- 
peated measures (see Fig. 2).3 The main ef- 
fect of Complainant was not significant 
among husbands and wives, Fs < 2.0, ns. The 
main effect of Demand/withdraw interac- 
tion was not significant among husbands, 
F(1,115) = 1.30, ns, and was marginally sig- 
nificant among wives, F(1,115) = 3 . 5 2 , ~  < 
.lo. In support of Hypothesis 2, the analysis 
revealed significant interaction effects of 
Complainant by Demand/withdraw pattern 
3.  We repeated this analysis for the overall ratings of 
demand/withdraw interaction, and this revealed 
identical results. 
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Figure 2. Rated representativeness of demandlwithdraw interaction as a function of 
complainant for husbands (a) and wives (b): Study 1. 
among husbands, F(1,115) = 10 .26 ,~  < .01, 
and wives, F(1,115) = 4 . 6 9 , ~  < .OS.Among 
husbands, wife-demandlhusband-withdraw 
interaction ( M  = 2.37, SD = .74) was rated 
as more representative than husband-de- 
mandlwife-withdraw interaction ( M  = 2.06, 
SD = .15) when the wife was the com- 
plainant, (53) = 3.15, p < .01. When the 
husband was the complainant, the rated 
representativeness of husband-demand1 
wife-withdraw ( M  = 2.39, SD = .59) and 
wife-demandlhusband-withdraw ( M  = 2.24, 
SD = 5 5 )  interaction did not differ signifi- 
cantly, r(62) = 1.45, ns. Likewise, among 
wives, wife-demandlhusband-withdraw in- 
teraction ( M  = 2.54, SD = .75) was rated as 
more representative than husband- de- 
mandlwife-withdraw interaction ( M  = 2.24, 
SD = .45) when the wife was the complain- 
ant, (65) = 2 . 9 7 , ~  < .01. The rated repre- 
sentativeness of husband-demand1 wife- 
withdraw ( M  = 2.43, SD = .69) and 
wife-demand/husband-withdraw ( M  = 2.41, 
S D  = .74) interaction did not differ signifi- 
cantly when the husband was the complain- 
ant,t(71) = .20,ns. 
We checked whether the conflict issue 
further qualified these effects with a 2 X 3 
X 2 (Complainant X Conflict issue X De- 
mandlwithdraw interaction) ANOVA, with 
Demandlwithdraw interaction as a re- 
peated measure. This only revealed a sig- 
nificant main effect of Conflict issue among 
wives, F(2, 132) = 3 . 9 5 , ~  < .OS. Demand1 
withdraw interactions were rated more rep- 
resentative among wives in the housework 
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( M  = 2.54, SD = 33) and child-care ( M  = 
2.44, SD = -54) conditions than in the paid 
work condition ( M  = 2.25, SD = .38), t(92) 
= 2 . 8 7 , ~  < .O1 and t(91) = 1 . 9 2 , ~  = .05, 
respectively. The means in the housework 
and child-care condition did not differ, t(87) 
= 36, ns. None of the interaction effects 
were significant, Fs < 1.0, ns. 
In sum, Hypothesis 2 was supported 
among both husbands and wives. Husbands 
and wives reported more wife-demand/hus- 
band-withdraw interaction than husband- 
demand/wife-withdraw interaction during 
hypothetical conflict over the division of 
labor, but only when the wife was the com- 
plainant. 
Discussion and Introduction to Study 2 
Study 1 showed that wife-demandhusband- 
withdraw interaction was reported more 
frequently than husband-demand/wife- 
withdraw interaction during the hypothe- 
sized conflict over the division of labor, but 
only when the wife desired a change in her 
spouse’s contribution. In addition, conflict 
over housework was reported to occur 
more frequently than conflict over paid 
work and child care. The analyses showed 
identical results for male and female partici- 
pants. However, analyzing the data for hus- 
bands and wives separately is not currently 
viewed as the optimal strategy for analyzing 
couple data (e.g., Gonzalez & Griffin, 1997; 
Kenny 1995,1996). Instead, gender should 
be included as a factor that is repeated 
within couples, which requires couple mem- 
bers to be assigned to the same condition. 
Furthermore, an interesting question 
that has remained unanswered is to what 
extent spouses who strive for change in the 
division of labor are able to accomplish this. 
Accordingly, our third research question in- 
volves the distributive outcomes of conflict 
over the division of labor: To what extent do 
spouses reach their goal-status quo mainte- 
nance versus change? Research on conflict 
in close relationships generally addresses 
the consequences of marital conflict in 
terms of general relationship outcomes 
such as marital quality and dissolution. 
Conflict outcomes that directly concern the 
conflict issue (e.g., who wins the argument) 
are rarely considered. In addition, we are 
not aware of any research that directly con- 
sidered outcomes in conflict situations with 
an asymmetrical structure, let alone in rela- 
tion to gender. 
Distributive outcomes: Status quo 
maintenance versus change 
In general, complainants depend on the co- 
operation and leniency of the defendant, 
that is, whether the defendant is willing to 
change his or her behavior. Defendants 
have a major advantage over complainants: 
The status quo is on their side and this gives 
them more power over the outcome. Typi- 
cally, those who want less have more to say, 
and those who desire change are in a less 
powerful position (see Babcock, Waltz, Ja- 
cobson, & Gottman, 1993; Keltner & Ro- 
binson, 1997; Waller & Hill, 1951). Hence, 
defendants determine the outcome to a 
greater extent than do complainants (cf. 
Pruitt, 1995). Of course, one could argue 
that defendants need the cooperation of 
complainants to maintain the status quo. 
For example, the husband who wants to 
maintain the current division of labor de- 
pends on his wife to do her share. The wife 
has control over the status quo because she 
can stop doing housework altogether. How- 
ever, this outcome is most likely worse for 
the wife than maintaining the status quo (cf. 
Kelley, 1979, p. 25). This suggests that com- 
plainants indeed have less control over the 
outcome than defendants because the com- 
plainant’s influence strategy leads to a situ- 
ation in which they are both worse off than 
before. 
Research on human information proc- 
essing and decision making has found evi- 
dence for status quo bias, the tendency for 
people to disproportionately stick with the 
status quo (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Samuel- 
son & Zeckhauser, 1988; Schweitzer, 1994). 
People tend to prefer the current state of 
affairs because changing the status quo in- 
volves the need to formulate a new ar- 
rangement, transition costs, ambivalence, 
272 E.S. Kluwer, J.A.M. Heesink, and E. van de Vliert 
risk, and uncertainty. People are committed 
to their past decisions and often believe 
that past alternatives have been chosen 
wisely (Schweitzer, 1994). Also, regulations 
that have been used in the past are fre- 
quently perceived as just (Mikula et al., 
1997). 
Preference for the status quo has also 
been explained in terms of loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Ritov & 
Baron, 1992). Changing the status quo en- 
tails gains and losses across different di- 
mensions. Because people are loss averse 
and losses weigh more heavily than com- 
mensurate gains, people will be inclined to 
favor the current state of affairs. As a con- 
sequence, loss aversion favors stability over 
change (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). The 
frame of outcomes does not only affect con- 
flict parties’ preference for the status quo, 
but it also affects their concession behavior. 
Conflict parties with a gain frame concede 
more and settle more easily than conflict 
parties with a loss frame (see De Dreu, 
Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1995). 
Because defendants face a potential loss 
and complainants face a potential gain (cf. 
Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1993), 
complainants will yield more easily than 
will defendants during the interaction and, 
consequently, will more often fail to reach 
their goal. Following from the above, we 
expect that defendants of the status quo are 
more likely to reach their goal than com- 
plainants during conflict over the division of 
labor (Hypothesis 3a). 
Demanding behavior is likely to increase 
the chance of goal accomplishment. Even 
though its use enhances conflict escalation, 
coercion tends to be effective in changing 
behavior (Noller, Feeney, Bonnell, & Cal- 
lan, 1994; Patterson, 1982). Demanding be- 
havior is considered a power strategy in 
close relationships (Babcock et al., 1993). 
Obviously, withdrawing behavior on the 
part of the complainant strongly decreases 
the chance that the spouse changes his or 
her behavior. Rather, it will result in status 
quo maintenance. Because women are 
more likely to demand than men, especially 
when they want to change the status quo, 
and men are more likely to withdraw than 
women, even when they desire change, we 
expect women to be more successful in 
their attempt to change the status quo than 
men in the role of complainant. Hence, our 
Hypothesis 3b: Women complainants are 
more likely to reach their goal than men 
complainants. 
Study 2 
Study 2 employed the same design and sce- 
narios as Study 1. It was designed to repli- 
cate the findings with regard to Hypothesis 
2 using Gender as a repeated measure. In 
addition, we now used the Communication 
Patterns Questionnaire (Christensen & 
Sullaway, 1984) to measure demand/with- 
draw interaction. To extend Study 1 and to 
test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we included 
measures of the distributive outcomes of 
the conflict. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. A new sample 
of 128 couples participated in this study. 
Spouses had shared their household for 6 
years on average and had a first child 
younger than 18 months old ( M  = 9.86, SD 
= 4.97). The mean ages of men and women 
were 32.0 and 27.8 years, respectively. Par- 
ticipants were recruited by assistants at 13 
child health centers. (Child health centers 
are commonly used in the Netherlands.) 
Husbands and wives received their ques- 
tionnaires at home, in a separate envelope 
that was addressed to them personally. 
They were instructed not to discuss the 
questionnaire with their spouse until they 
had completed it, and they returned their 
questionnaires in separate envelopes. Non- 
respondents were reminded by phone. 
Eventually, 71 % of the participants who in- 
itially agreed to participate returned their 
completed questionnaire by mail. Couples 
were assigned to experimental conditions 
on a random basis. Owing to small vari- 
ations in response rates between conditions, 
the number of couples in the conditions 
varied between 17 and 24. 
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Dependent variables. Participants read the 
scenario and were instructed to try to imag- 
ine they were in the described situation. 
Participants thereafter indicated how they 
would deal with the described situation. De- 
mand/withdraw interaction was measured 
with the Communication Patterns Ques- 
tionnaire (CPQ; Christensen & Sullaway, 
1984). Participants rated the likelihood that 
each interaction pattern would occur (1 = 
very unlikely to 7 = very likely). Wife-de- 
mand/husband-withdraw and husband-de- 
mand/wife-withdraw interaction were each 
measured by three items: “I try to start a 
discussion while my spouse tries to avoid a 
discussion”; “I pressure, nag, or demand 
while my spouse withdraws, becomes silent, 
or refuses to discuss the matter further”; and 
“I criticize while my spouse defends him- or 
herself.” We also asked each item in re- 
versed form so that the items were pre- 
sented with both spouses in each of two 
roles. 
Although the reliability and validity of 
the CPQSF have been demonstrated by 
others (e.g., Christensen & Heavey, 1990, 
1993; Heavey et al., 1993; Klinetob & Smith, 
1996; Noller & White, 1990), the alpha reli- 
abilities were quite low (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .63 for wife-demand/husband-withdraw 
interaction and alpha = .53 for husband-de- 
mand/wife-withdraw interaction) and could 
not be improved by omitting items. In past 
research, the alpha reliabilities of the de- 
mand/withdraw subscales have been found 
to vary between S O  and 3 5 ,  with a mean of 
.74 for wife-demand/husband-withdraw in- 
teraction and .65 for husband-demand/ 
wife-withdraw interaction (Christensen & 
Heavey, 1990; Heavey et al., 1993; Klinetob 
& Smith, 1996; Kluwer et al., 1997). Failure 
to achieve a high reliability may be caused 
by using a 3-item scale. (According to the 
Spearman Brown Prophecy formula, an al- 
pha of .53 corresponds to an alpha of ap- 
proximately .70 if the scale had consisted of 
five items; Nunnally, 1978.) It should be 
noted that low reliabilities provide conser- 
vative tests of significance (cf. Nunnally, 
1978). 
Finally, we asked participants how likely 
the following conflict outcomes would be in 
the described situation (1 = very unlikely to 
7 = very likely): “My spouse’s (my) time 
spent on housework (paid workkhild care) 
remains unchanged, like my spouse (I) 
wants,” and “My spouse’s (my) time spent 
on housework (paid work/child care) 
changes, like I (my spouse) want.” The first 
item always meant that the situation re- 
mained unchanged (defendant reaches goal) 
and the second item meant that the situation 
changed as the complainant desired (com- 
plainant reaches goal). 
Results 
When dyad members are not interchange- 
able, such as in heterosexual couples, nonin- 
dependence can be estimated by a regular 
Pearson correlation coefficient (Gonzalez 
& Griffin, 1997; Kenny, 1995,1996). The re- 
sponses of the husband and the wife corre- 
lated moderately (.37 for wife-demand/hus- 
band-withdraw interaction; .19 for husband- 
demand/wife-withdraw interaction; and .26 
and .36 for both conflict outcomes, p s  < .05), 
which implied that nonindependence ex- 
isted to some extent. Accordingly, we con- 
ducted the analyses on the couple level, with 
gender as a repeated measure. 
Demand/withdraw interaction. Hypothesis 
2 was tested with a 2 X 2 X 2 (Complainant 
X Demand/withdraw interaction X Gen- 
der) ANOVA, with Demand/withdraw in- 
teraction and Gender as repeated measures 
(see Fig. 3). The main effect of Complainant 
was not significant, F(1,124) = .06,ns. The 
main effect of Demand/withdraw interac- 
tion was significant, F(1,124) = 31.23, p < 
-001. Wife-demandlhusband-withdraw in- 
teraction ( M  = 3.25, SD = 1.45) was re- 
ported more likely to occur than husband- 
demand/wife-withdraw interaction ( M  = 
2.69, SD = 1.23). The main effect of Gender 
was significant, F(1, 124) = 4.65, p < .05. 
Wives reported a greater likelihood of de- 
mand/withdraw interactions than did their 
husbands ( M  = 3.10 versus M = 2.85). 
In support of Hypothesis 2, the analysis 
revealed a significant interaction effect of 
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Figure 3. Self-reported likelihood of dem 
complainant: Study 2. 
Complainant by Demandlwithdraw pat- 
tern, F(1,124) = 11.15,~ < .001. When the 
wife was the complainant, wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw interaction ( M  = 3.38, 
SD = 1.16) was reported more likely to oc- 
cur than husband-demand/wife-withdraw 
interaction ( M  = 2.53, SD = .91), t(67) = 
6 . 4 9 , ~  < .001. When the husband was the 
complainant, the reported likelihood of 
wife-demand/husband-withdraw ( M  = 3.10, 
SD = 1.23) and husband-demandlwife- 
withdraw ( M  = 2.89, SD = .96) interaction 
did not differ significantly, t(57) = 1.56, ns.4 
None of the interaction effects with Gender 
were significant, Fs < 1.0, ns. 
As in Study 1, a 2 X 3 X 2 X 2 (Com- 
plainant X Conflict issue X Demand/with- 
draw interaction X Gender) ANOVA, with 
Demand/withdraw interaction and Gender 
as repeated measures, revealed a signifi- 
cant main effect of Conflict issue, F(2,120) 
= 3 . 1 6 , ~  < .05. Demand/withdraw interac- 
tion was reported more likely to occur in 
the housework condition ( M  = 3.22, SD = 
4. Because the alpha reliabilities for the demand/ 
withdraw scales were low, we ran a 2 X 2 X 3 
(Complainant X Demandlwithdraw interaction X 
Item) ANOVA with Demand/withdraw interac- 
tion and the items of the demand/withdraw sub- 
scales as repeated measures. This revealed a non- 
significant three-way interaction, F(2, 251) = 1.58, 
ns. Hence, the items had no significant multivariate 
effect. In addition, we tested Hypothesis 2 at the 
item level and this revealed identical results. 
andlwithdraw interaction as a function of 
.99) than in the paid work condition ( M  = 
2.70, SD = .95), f(85) = 2 . 4 7 , ~  < .05. The 
means in the housework and child-care ( M  
= 2.98, SD = .73) conditions and the 
means in the paid work and child-care con- 
ditions did not differ significantly, fs < 1.50, 
11s. None of the interaction effects with 
Conflict outcome or with Gender were sig- 
nificant, Fs < 1.0, ns. 
To summarize these results, Hypothesis 2 
was again supported. Wife-demandlhus- 
band-withdraw interaction was reported 
more likely to occur than husband-demand/ 
wife-withdraw interaction during the hy- 
pothesized conflict over the division of la- 
bor, but only when the wife was the com- 
plainant. 
Conflict outcomes. Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
were tested with a 2 X 2 X 2 (Complainant X 
Conflict outcome X Gender) ANOVA,with 
Conflict outcome and Gender as repeated 
measures. The main effects of Complainant 
and Gender were not significant, Fs < .40, 
ns. The main effect of Conflict outcome was 
significant, F(1, 120) = 27.43, p < .001. In 
support of Hypothesis 3a, defendants ( M  = 
3.98, SD = 1.46) were expected to be more 
likely to reach their goal than were com- 
plainants ( M  = 2.98, SD = 1.23) during hy- 
pothetical conflict over the division of labor. 
The interaction effect of Complainant by 
Conflict outcome approached significance, 
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F(1,120) = 3 .51 ,~  = MThereported iikeli- 
hood that defendants would reach their goal 
when the wife was the complainant ( M  = 
3.81, SD = 1.50) and when the husband was 
the complainant ( M  = 4.13, SD = 1.50) did 
not differ significantly, t(121) = 1.19, ns. In 
the role of complainant, however, wives ( M  
= 3.19, SD = 1.26) were reported more 
likely to reach their goal than were hus- 
bands (M = 2.73, SD = 1.15), t(120) = 2.08, 
p < .05. These results supported Hypothesis 
3b, namely that wives are more likely to 
reach their goal than are husbands in the 
role of complainant. The analyses revealed a 
significant interaction effect of Complain- 
ant by Gender, F(1,120) = 1 0 . 0 4 , ~  < .001. 
However, because the hypothesized effects 
were not qualified by interactions with Gen- 
der, we will disregard this effect. 
The explanation for Hypothesis 3b was 
that, in the role of complainant, women are 
more likely to demand than men, and men 
are more likely to withdraw than women. 
Accordingly, the effect of Complainant on 
the outcome Complainant reaches goal 
should disappear when the wife-demand1 
husband-withdraw interaction variable is 
held constant. We tested this with a multi- 
variate analysis of variance on the Conflict 
outcomes with Complainant as a between- 
subjects factor and Wife-demand/husband- 
withdraw interaction as a covariate. The sig- 
nificant univariate F-test for the outcome 
Complainant reaches goal, F(1,120) = 4.32, 
p < .05, was reduced when wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw interaction was held 
constant, F(1,118) = 3.48, ns. However, the 
analysis showed only a marginal significant 
regression coefficient for wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw interaction, B = .17 (t  = 
1.86, p = .06). A significance test for the 
indirect effect of Complainant on the 
outcome Complainant reaches goal via wife- 
demandlhusband-withdraw interaction pro- 
vided a nonsignificant t-value of 1.22 (for 
the procedure, see Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The analyses showed nonsignificant uni- 
variate F-tests for the outcome Defendant 
reaches goal, but revealed a significant 
regression coefficient for wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw interaction, B = .25 (t  = 
2.26, p < .05). In sum, these results do not 
show strong support for our reasoning that 
wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction 
mediates the effect of Complainant on the 
outcome Complainant reaches goal. 
To see whether the conflict issue affected 
the conflict outcomes, we conducted a 2 X 3 
X 2 X 2 (Complainant X Conflict issue X 
Conflict outcome X Gender) ANOVA,with 
Conflict outcome and Gender as repeated 
measures. The main effect of Conflict issue 
was not significant, F(2,116) = 1.36,ns. The 
significant two-way interactions of Com- 
plainant by Conflict outcome, F(1, 116) = 
3 . 7 9 , ~  = .05, and of Complainant by Con- 
flict issue, F(2, 116) = 3.36, p < .05 were 
qualified by a significant three-way interac- 
tion of Complainant by Conflict outcome 
by Conflict issue, F(2,116) = 3 . 6 1 , ~  < .05. 
To understand the nature of this three-way 
interaction, we conducted simple effects 
analyses testing the main effects of Com- 
plainant within each level of Conflict issue, 
using the overall error term (see Table 2). 
Because Gender had no main or interaction 
effects (except for the significant interac- 
tion effect of Complainant by Gender), the 
conflict outcomes were averaged across 
husband and wife within couples. 
The multivariate main effect of Com- 
plainant was significant in the Housework 
condition,F(2,115) = 8 . 5 0 , ~  < .001, and the 
Paid work condition, F(2,115) = 3.40, p < 
.OS. Although the multivariate main effect of 
Complainant was not significant in the 
Child-care condition, F(2, 115) = 1.87, ns, 
the univariate F-tests showed a pattern in 
the expected direction. The univariate tests 
showed that the main effect of Complainant 
for the conflict outcome defendant reaches 
goal, was not significant in any of the Con- 
flict issue conditions, Fs < 1.40, ns. In the 
hypothetical role of defendant, the reported 
likelihood that husbands and wives would 
reach their goal did not differ across the 
Conflict issue conditions. For the conflict 
outcome complainant reaches goal, the uni- 
variate main effect of Complainant was sig- 
nificant within all Conflict issue conditions, 
Fs > 3 .77 ,~  = .05. Consistent with Hypothe- 
sis 3b, wives in the role of complainant were 
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Table 2. Conflict outcomes as a function of complainant and conflict issue: Study 2 
Conflict issue 
Complainanta 
Paid Work Housework Child Care 
H W H W H W 
Outcome 
Defendant reaches goal 4.21 4.06 4.48 3.96 3.68 3.45 
Complainant reaches goal 2.85 2.35 2.39 3.76 3.1 1 3.55 
(1.23) (1.07) (1.16) (1.13) (.YO) (1.12) 
(1.03) (1.53) (1.71) (1.41) (1.36) (1.45) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
aH = husband: W = wife. 
reported more likely to reach their goal than 
husbands in the role of Complainant in the 
Housework condition, F(1,116) = 17.16, p 
< .001, and the Child-care condition, F(1, 
116) = 3 . 7 7 , ~  = .05. However, in the Paid 
work condition, wives were reported less 
likely to reach their goal than husbands in 
the roleofcomplainant,F(1,116) = 6 .08 ,~  < 
.05. This suggests that complainants were 
more likely expected to reach their goal 
when the hypothetical conflict concerned 
their own gender stereotypical domain. 
General Discussion 
The first aim of the present research was to 
increase our knowledge about how couples 
manage (hypothetical) conflict over the di- 
vision of labor. Our second aim was to gain 
insight into the impact of asymmetrical con- 
flict structures on marital interaction and 
outcomes. We addressed three research 
questions: (1) Which conflict issues with re- 
gard to the division of labor are most promi- 
nent in couples’ lives; (2) How do spouses 
manage conflict over the division of labor, 
focusing on asymmetrical demand/with- 
draw interaction patterns; and (3) What are 
the outcomes of conflict over the division of 
labor-status quo maintenance or change? 
Conflict issue and demandlwithdraw 
interaction 
Study 1 showed that spouses reported more 
conflict over housework than conflict over 
paid work and child care. These results are 
in line with research that compared conflict 
over housework with conflict over paid 
work (Kluwer et al., 1996,1997). It is impor- 
tant to separate the domains of housework 
and child care because they differ in many 
respects. For example, the costs of neglect- 
ing child care are quite different from the 
costs of neglecting housework, and differ- 
ent strategies might be used to change the 
spouse’s involvement in these domains (cf. 
Deutsch et al., 1993). Both studies showed 
that, overall, demand/withdraw patterns 
were reported most likely to occur during 
the hypothetical conflict over housework. 
Study 1 also showed that wives were re- 
ported more often than husbands to desire 
a change in their spouses’ contribution to 
the division of labor. Hence, this implies 
that women tend to be less satisfied with 
the division of housework than men, and 
their desire to change their spouse’s contri- 
bution brings them into conflict with their 
spouses’ efforts to maintain the status quo. 
The asymmetrical structure of this par- 
ticular conflict issue supports the gender 
linkage in behavior in close relationships- 
wives’ tendency to demand and husbands’ 
tendency to withdraw. In other words, wives’ 
desire to change the division of housework 
combined with their tendency to demand 
and husbands’ desire to maintain the status 
quo combined with their tendency to 
withdraw causes the interaction pattern to 
become highly stereotyped. Indeed, both 
Study 1 and Study 2 showed that wife-de- 
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mand/husband-withdraw interaction was 
reported more often than husband-de- 
mand/wife-withdraw interaction during hy- 
pothetical conflict over the division of labor 
when the wife desired a change in her hus- 
band’s contribution. When the husband de- 
sired change, the interaction patterns were 
reported equally often. 
Our research is the first to show that prior 
findings on demandtwithdraw interaction 
apply to labor distribution issues, as sug- 
gested by some researchers (Heavey et al., 
1993; Holmes & Levinger, 1994; Holmes & 
Murray, 1996). By recognizing that conflict 
over the division of labor involves an asym- 
metrical complainant-defendant structure 
that is likely to result in demand/withdraw 
interaction patterns, we identified a poten- 
tial barrier to the resolution of conflict over 
the division of labor and, consequently, the 
negotiation of new arrangements and gen- 
der roles. Wife-demand/husband-withdraw 
interaction tends to result in polarization 
and rigidity (Heavey et al., 1993) and de- 
structive outcomes such as conflict escala- 
tion and stalemate (Kluwer et al., 1997).Fur- 
thermore, demand/withdraw interaction is 
negatively related to marital satisfaction 
(e.g., Christensen & Schenk, 1991; Heavey, 
Christensen, & Malamuth, 1995; Gottman & 
Krokoff, 1989) and both violent and non- 
violent distressed couples report more de- 
mand/withdraw interaction than do non- 
distressed couples (Babcock et al., 1993; 
Holtzworth-Munroe, Smutzler, & Stuart, 
1998)s 
Although conflict over the division of la- 
bor implies women’s growing sense of enti- 
tlement and provides a means by which 
women modify traditional gender roles, it 
5. In Study 2, we collected a reliable measure of mari- 
tal satisfaction (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998), 
which correlated negatively with wife-demand/ 
husband-withdraw interaction ( r  = -.39,p < .001) 
and husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction ( r  
= -.24, p < ,001). In general, spouses were quite 
satisfied with their relationship ( M  = 7.91, SD = 
1.0, on a 9-point scale). These results suggest that 
although the demand/withdraw patterns were more 
pronounced among more dissatisfied couples, even 
relatively satisfied couples seem to report these in- 
teraction patterns during hypothetical conflict over 
the division of labor. 
may also function as a trap because women’s 
role as a complainant leads them to resort to 
the destructive wife-demand/husband-with- 
draw interaction. Accordingly, the division 
of housework is bound to come up again and 
is unlikely to change in a way that satisfies 
both spouses. This may partly explain why 
the division of housework often involves an 
ongoing struggle in close relationships and is 
least likely to be divided equally. Compared 
with the division of paid work the division of 
housework appears to lag behind in becom- 
ing less gender segregated (e.g., Kalleberg & 
Rosenfeld, 1990; Kluwer et al., 1996; Spitze, 
1988). 
Conflict outcomes 
Study 2 showed that defendants were ex- 
pected to be more likely to reach their goal 
than complainants during hypothetical con- 
flict over the division of labor. This implies 
that conflict over the division of labor is 
more likely to result in status quo mainte- 
nance than in change. In general, accom- 
plishing change is difficult because dissent- 
ers go against the spirit of the times and have 
to work against “relationship inertia” -re- 
lationships tend to be slow to adapt to new 
circumstances. Although tolerance and loy- 
alty toward imbalances in the relationship 
serve relationship maintenance (Holmes & 
Levinger, 1994), relationships and their sur- 
rounding environments are subject to con- 
stant change. Disruptions, such as the birth 
of the first child, present new demands that 
require new adaptations and arrangements 
(cf. Belsky & Kelly, 1994). If unaddressed, 
small problems can grow into larger ones, 
and spouses may gradually drift out of touch 
with each other’s needs. 
Study 2 also showed that wives were ex- 
pected more likely to reach their goal than 
were husbands in the role of complainant. 
The explanation was that wives’ tendency to 
demand would enhance their chance of goal 
accomplishment when they desired change 
and husbands’ tendency to withdraw would 
decrease their chance of accomplishing 
change. Although our analyses showed 
some support for this explanation, it is 
somewhat premature to conclude that wife- 
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demand/husband-withdraw interaction me- 
diates the gender difference in goal accom- 
plishment. Further research is needed to 
address the underlying processes between 
conflict management and status quo main- 
tenance and change. 
An explanation that cannot be ruled out 
is that women’s complaint is viewed as 
more legitimate, causing husbands to be 
more willing to change their contribution to 
the division of labor. In past decades, social 
norms have gradually shifted toward equal- 
ity between men and women in both paid 
and family work, and men face an increas- 
ing pressure to become active participants 
in family work (see Kluwer et al., 1997). 
These norms may cause husbands to regard 
it socially unacceptable to refuse their 
spouses’ requests with regard to their con- 
tribution to the division of labor. Hence, 
participants’ ratings of conflict outcomes 
may have been affected by concerns about 
impression management. 
An alternative explanation is that wives 
have more control over the outcomes be- 
cause they possess greater knowledge, skill, 
and information with regard to the division 
of labor. Accordingly, they can exert infor- 
mational influence and use their expert 
power to accomplish change (cf. Babcock et 
al., 1993; Cromwell & Olson, 1975; French & 
Raven, 1959). For example, Dovidio, Brown, 
Heltman, Ellyson, and Keating (1988) 
found systematic differences in the power- 
related behaviors of men and women in 
situations where there was differential fa- 
miliarity based on the gender-linked nature 
of the task (i.e., automotive oil changing 
versus pattern sewing). Indeed, our data 
show support for this post hoc explanation: 
Wives were more likely expected to reach 
their goal than were husbands in the role of 
complainant, but only when the conflict con- 
cerned housework or child cure. When the 
conflict concerned paid work, husbands 
rather than wives were more likely ex- 
pected to reach their goal in the role of com- 
plainant. This implies that complainants 
stand a better chance of reaching their goal 
when the conflict concerns their own gen- 
der stereotypical domain. Defendants may 
also be more resistant to change when it 
comes to their own gender role. Spouses 
might be particularly sensitive to criticism 
regarding their own traditional gender role, 
because it puts their identity at stake (cf. 
Baruch & Barnett, 1986; Kluwer et al., 
1997). This will occur even more when this 
identity entails one’s major life role (for ex- 
ample, in the case of the full-time house- 
wife/mother or  the full-time employee). 
Although these post hoc explanations 
seem liable, it is important to replicate the 
reported effects. In general, the interplay 
among power of the status quo, power on 
other dimensions, and power strategies in 
terms of behaviors (cf. Babcock et al., 1993; 
Falbo & Peplau, 1980) appears to be a fruit- 
ful direction for further research on asym- 
metrical conflict. In addition, this research 
addressed short-term win/lose outcomes 
only. Future research should not only ad- 
dress other conflict outcomes, such as inte- 
grative solutions and impasses, but also the 
long-term effects of conflict over the divi- 
sion of labor. It may very well be that cou- 
ples manage to reach more equal arrange- 
ment in the domain of family work but fail 
to implement changes in the long run (see 
Kluwer et al., 1999). 
Study limitutions 
A few limitations to this research deserve 
attention. First, the self-report nature of this 
study merely allows for conclusions about 
couples’ reported representations of mari- 
tal interaction patterns and outcomes. 
These representations may not match what 
spouses would actually do, and they may 
have been affected by concerns about so- 
cial desirability and by egocentric biases. 
For example, individuals tend to view them- 
selves as more cooperative and less com- 
petitive than their partner in relationship 
conflict (Kluwer et al., 1998). Observations 
of actual conflict behavior would have sev- 
eral advantages for the study of conflict 
over the division of labor. However, we be- 
lieve that self-reports of conflict interac- 
tions are a valuable method to explore the 
field among a large subject pool. 
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Second, although both Study 1 and prior 
research (Kluwer et al., 1997) suggest that 
the conflict situations used in this study oc- 
cur in couples’ lives, the scenarios were still 
hypothetical. A problem with the use of hy- 
pothetical scenarios is that the data may 
reflect spouses’ stereotypical beliefs about 
their own and their partner’s behaviors 
rather than their actual behaviors. How- 
ever, research has shown that individuals 
are unlikely to use gender role stereotypes 
in describing their partner’s behavior (Klu- 
wer et al., 1998). Couple members are very 
familiar with their own and their partner’s 
marital behaviors (i.e., they have access to 
individuating information about their part- 
ner), so they are less likely to rely on (gen- 
der) stereotypes (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). 
The fact that we collected couple data 
may compensate for these shortcomings to 
some extent. Our research showed no 
(within-couple) gender differences on the 
hypothesized effects, and this convergence 
between couple members bolsters our con- 
clusions. In general, couple members tend 
to agree on the presence of demand/with- 
draw interactions in their relationship (cf. 
Christensen & Heavey, 1990,1993; Heavey 
et al., 1993; Klinetob & Smith, 1996; Noller 
et al., 1994). If egocentric biases would have 
colored spouses’ reports of their conflict 
behaviors and outcomes, we would prob- 
ably have found gender differences in their 
reports (cf. Kluwer et al., 1998). 
The scenarios did not contain informa- 
tion about the absolute or relative amount 
of work done by spouses, which may have 
caused the meaning of the scenarios to be 
ambiguous. The meaning that participants 
have attached to the scenario has implica- 
tions for the interpretation of the results, 
and these interpretations should therefore 
be made with caution. However, we empha- 
size that this study focused explicitly on 
spouses’ subjective impressions and percep- 
tions of imbalance, not the objective imbal- 
ance in the division of labor. The objective 
imbalance in the division of labor may thus 
have had less impact on participants’ rat- 
ings. In addition, it is important to note that 
we did not manipulate the direction of the 
desired change. The direction of desired 
change may affect the results to some ex- 
tent. For example, making the spouse do 
something (do more housework) may be 
subject to different dynamics than making 
the spouse refrain from doing something 
(do less housework). 
Finally, our conclusions are limited to 
couples who have recently experienced 
their transition to parenthood. The transi- 
tion to parenthood has been found to in- 
volve increased levels of conflict and de- 
clines in marital satisfaction (e.g., Belsky & 
Kelly, 1994). New parents tend to report 
fewer positive interactions and more nega- 
tive conflict behaviors, such as demand/ 
withdraw interaction, and increased conflict 
avoidance after their transition to parent- 
hood (Crohan, 1996; Kluwer et al., 1999). 
Conclusions 
The present research supports a struc- 
tural/behavioral explanation for the persist- 
ence of gender inequality and gender-based 
roles. The conclusions inform us that marital 
conflict over the division of labor generally 
concerns the wife, who is dissatisfied with 
her husband’s contribution to housework, 
while her husband wants to maintain the 
status quo. The structure of this dilemma 
reinforces gender inequality because (a) it 
activates the asymmetrical demand/with- 
draw interaction pattern that further esca- 
lates the conflict, and (b) it favors status quo 
maintenance over change. Of course, many 
couples realize relatively satisfying arrange- 
ments. However, both social changes and 
major life transitions cause couples to reex- 
amine their role arrangements. Perceptions 
of injustice and imbalance are accentuated 
at that time, and marital conflict becomes 
apparent (Holmes & Levinger, 1994). By 
examining (hypothetical) conflict over the 
division of labor, this research not only adds 
to our knowledge about the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the division of la- 
bor but it also identifies a potential barrier 
in the negotiation of new arrangements and 
changes in gender roles. 
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